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Abstract
One of the most complex systems is the human brain whose formalized functioning is
characterized by decision theory. We present a “Quantum Decision Theory” of decision
making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathemati-
cal structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many
incorporated intentions, which allows us to explain a variety of interesting fallacies and
anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision making of real human
beings. The theory describes entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subse-
quent decisions, and intention interference of composite prospects. We demonstrate how
the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle (disjunction effect) can be explained
as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty.
The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. We
demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes, documented in the context of clas-
sical decision theory, are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which
finding straightforward explanations in the frame of the developed quantum approach.
Keywords: Decision theory, utility theory, paradoxes in decision making, action interfer-
ence and entanglement, action prospects
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1 Introduction
The human brain is certainly one of the most complex systems known in nature and it is
therefore attracting strong interest in the attempts of understanding its functioning. There are
two ways of describing the latter. One way is the study of physiological processes occurring in
the brain, related to physical and chemical effects governing the process of thinking. Another
approach is devoted to the formalized description of the thinking process in terms of decision
making theory. The latter approach forms the basis of decision theory employed in social and
economic sciences.
The scope of the present paper is the description of the brain functioning in terms of
decision theory. We propose a novel theory of decision making, based on the mathematical
theory of Hilbert spaces (Dieudonne´, 2006) and employing the mathematical techniques that
are used in the quantum theory of physical measurements. Because of the latter, we call
this approach the Quantum Decision Theory (QDT). This approach can be thought of as the
mathematically simplest and most natural extension of objective probabilities into nonlinear
subjective probabilities. The proposed formalism allows us to explain quantitatively without
adjustable parameters the known paradoxes, such as the disjunction and conjunction effects.
The disjunction effect is the failure of humans to obey the sure-thing principle of classical
probability theory. The conjunction effect is a logical fallacy that occurs when people assume
that specific conditions are more probable than a single general one. Our QDT also unearths a
deep relationship between the conjunction and the disjunction effects. We show that the former
is sufficient for the later to exist.
Decision theory is concerned with identifying what are the optimal decisions and how
to reach them. Traditionally, it is a part of discrete mathematics. Much of decision the-
ory is normative and prescriptive, and assumes that people are fully-informed and rational
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Savage, 1954). These assumptions have been ques-
tioned early on with the evidence provided by the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and by many
other behavioral paradoxes (Camerer et al., 2003), showing that humans often seem to deviate
from the prescription of rational decision theory due to cognitive and emotion biases. Prob-
lems, occurring in the interpretation of classical utility theory and its application to real human
decision processes, have been discussed in an extensive literature (e.g., Berger, 1985; Weidlich,
1991; Zeckhauser, 2006; Machina, 2008). The theories of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955)
and of behavioral economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin, 2005) have been devel-
oped to account for these deviations. As reviewed by Machina (2008), alternative models of
preferences over objectively or subjectively uncertain prospects have attempted to accommo-
date these systematic departures from the expected utility model, while retaining as much of
its analytical power as possible. In particular, non-additive nonlinear probability models have
been developed to account for the deviations from objective to subjective probabilities observed
in human agents (Quiggin, 1982; Gilboa, 1987; Schmeidler, 1989; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989;
Cohen and Tallon, 2000; Montesano, 2008). Decision making in the presence of uncertainty
about the states of nature has been formalized in the statistical decision theory (Lindgren, 1971;
White, 1976; Hastings and Mello, 1978; Rivett, 1980; Buchanan, 1982; Berger, 1985; Marshall
and Oliver, 1995; Bather, 2000; French and Insua, 2000; Raiffa and Schlaifer, 2000; Weirich,
2001). However, many paradoxes remain unexplained or are sometimes rationalized on an ad
hoc basis, which does not provide much predictive power.
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To break this stalemate, our approach relies and extends von Neumann (1955) theory of
quantum measurements in two principal aspects. First of all, we generalize the theory of quan-
tum measurements to active objects, which are not simply passive systems exposed by a mea-
surement performed by an external observer, but which are complex decision makers themselves,
characterized by their own strategic state. Certainly, humans are extremely complex systems
with many inaccessible features, such as emotions, biases, and subconscious processes. Indeed,
even the most modern and precise measurements and localization of brain activity offer at best a
rough cartography of physical operations only indirectly related to the thought processes. While
inaccessible, one should not underestimate the importance of emotions and of subconscious pro-
cesses in decision making, as is evidenced by a growing body of multidisciplinary research. The
problem is that these inaccessible features of brain processes cannot be accounted for in the de-
cision procedures based on the classical utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953)
and its extensions. As a consequence, a variety of different anomalies and paradoxes, some of
them already mentioned, have emerged from the confrontation of classical decision theory with
empirical data on the decisions and choices made by real humans. In contrast, QDT is based
on a minimalist set of axioms that lead to predictions on decision making that are in agreement
with observed behaviors.
While being a direct descendent of the von Neumann (1955) theory of measurement, our
approach is more general, complementing it by novel notions that are, necessary for practical
applications to active decision makers. The second important point of our theory is that,
beyond simple actions, we consider complex actions that can be composed of several action
representations or action modes. The relevance of the quantum description for classical objects
can be justified by the following analogy. Quantum theory, as is known, could be interpreted as a
cross-section of an underlying classical theory equipped with a large number of contextual hidden
variables (see, e.g., Yukalov, 1975). However, in order to describe the results of N measurements
on a single quantum system, it is necessary to involve a number of hidden variables which is
proportional to N (Dakic et al., 2008). Hence, to describe any number of experiments on
many systems, it is necessary to introduce an infinite number of hidden variables. Such a
way of describing physical measurements is, evidently, unpractical. The techniques of quantum
theory, avoiding the necessity of dealing with numerous unspecified hidden variables, provide the
simplest method of characterizing any number of physical measurements on an arbitrary number
of systems. In the case of decision theory, the role of hidden variables is played by various biases,
underlying emotions, subconscious feelings, and other hidden features characterizing decision
makers. This is why the quantum approach seems to provide the simplest way of taking into
account such hidden characteristics, at the same time avoiding the necessity of explicitly dealing
with them, similarly to avoiding the hidden variables in quantum theory.
Our approach is based on more than just the argument that human decisions involve com-
plex processes beyond the reach of detailed empirical or theoretical analysis. It is based on
the hypothesis that the thought processes, involved in the definition and analysis of alternative
prospects and scenarios, do not necessarily separate them according to the recipes of standard
probability theory. Our QDT formalizes systematically a broader class of decision making
processes in which prospects can interact, interfere and remain entangled. Our formulation of
QDT thus captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incor-
porated intentions. Dealing with composite prospects involves entangling operations and the
appearance of decision interference, characterizing decision procedures under the perception
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of uncertainty and/or potential harmful consequences. When such a generalization to stan-
dard probability theory and to the usual optimization of classical decision theory is introduced,
we find that all the paradoxes are explained as unavoidable consequences of the more general
process of decision making described by the QDT. We apply the developed machinery to sev-
eral examples typical of various paradoxes of classical decision theory. By the corresponding
theorems, we prove that no such paradoxes exist in QDT.
Historically, the idea that the process of human thinking can be described by the techniques
of quantum theory was advanced by Bohr (1933, 1937). Using these techniques, it would be
possible to characterize the complex psychological processes occurring in human mind and
accompanied by the effects typical of quantum theory, for instance, by interference. From
time to time, the Bohr ideas have been revived in the literature (e.g., Busemeyer et al., 2006).
However, no decision theory has been suggested, which would have predictive power.
While developing the mathematical theory of quantum measurements, Von Neumann (1955)
mentioned that the measurement procedure, to some extent, reminds of the process of tak-
ing decisions. This analogy has been further emphasized by Benioff (1972) in his description
of quantum information processing. The basics of a general approach, treating human deci-
sion making as a kind of quantum theory of measurements, was announced in the brief letter
(Yukalov and Sornette, 2008). The possibility of constructing a thinking quantum system, imi-
tating the process of human decision making, has been advanced (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009).
It was also shown that the QDT approach provides a natural explanation for the phenomenon
of dynamic inconsistency (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009). The main aim of the present paper is
twofold. First, we develop the general Quantum Decision Theory, describing in detail the basic
mathematical structure of QDT. Second, we prove several theorems explaining the origin of the
classical paradoxes in standard decision making and show that such paradoxes do not appear in
QDT. The rigorous mathematical proof that QDT is free of any kind of the paradoxes, plaguing
classical decision theory, is the principal novel result of this paper.
In our recent paper (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009), we have concentrated our attention on
the phenomenon of dynamic inconsistency, which we do not touch here. In contrast, we analyze
here other paradoxes that have not been treated in our previous papers, which makes the main
content of the present paper principally different and new.
It is also worth stressing the main points distinguishing our approach from the von Neumann
quantum theory of measurement:
(i) First of all, in quantum measurements, a passive quantum system is subject to a mea-
suring action from an external observer. Contrary to this, a decision maker is an active subject
taking decisions by himself/herself, thus, the decisions being the product of an internal process.
(ii) The measuring devices, acting on quantum systems, are more or less the same for
different systems. Mathematically, the measurement procedure can be described by calculating
the expectation values for local observables, with respect to any complete basis. But a decision
maker is a personality that is characterized by his/her own features, which mathematically
implies that there exists a specific strategic state associated with this decision maker. Therefore
any expectation value is to be taken with respect to this strategic state, and not with respect
to an arbitrary basis. This point is one of the principal differences with the previous attempts
to use the formalism of quantum mechanics to decision theory.
(iii) Quantum systems, in the majority of cases, are relatively simple, as compared to
human brains. In the process of decision making, one usually considers not just simple actions
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but rather complicated prospects, composed of several actions. This makes it necessary to
systematically consider composite prospects, which is somewhat similar to dealing with complex
systems with a complicated internal structure.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In order to emphasize that the theory is problem-
driven, we present in Sec. 2 several most often cited paradoxes in classical decision making, the
Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, and the Kahneman-Tversky paradox. Section 3 introduces
the definition of “intended actions” and “prospects” and of the mathematical notions to describe
them. Section 4 defines the mathematical structure of the mode states, mode space, and the
space of mind. Section 5 introduces the prospect probability operators. Section 6 defines the
prospect probabilities as being the observables in the decision process. Section 7 formulates the
rules according to which a decision is performed within the mathematical construction of QDT.
Section 7 also describes the phenomenon of decision interference occurring under uncertainty
and/or perceived potential harm. For this, the notion of composite prospects is introduced and
the principle of “aversion to uncertainty and loss” is defined. Section 8 applies the previous
definitions and concepts to binary decision cases, as they form the most common situation
in the empirical literature. Section 9 presents the major results of the theory, showing how
the main paradoxes documented in the literature are explained within QDT. The following
paradoxes are addressed: the Allais paradox (or compatibility paradox), the independence
paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, the inversion paradox, the invariance violation, described by
Kahneman and Tversky, the certainty effects, the disjunction effect (or violation of the Savage
sure-thing principle), the conjunction fallacy, and the isolation effect (or focusing, availability,
salience, framing, or elicitation effects). Section 9 ends with a prediction on the condition under
which several of these paradoxes can occur simultaneously. In particular, we predict that the
conjunction fallacy should be accompanied by the disjunction effect. Section 10 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Some Famous Paradoxes
There exist several paradoxes in classical decision theory based on the notion of expected utility.
Despite numerous attempts to resolve these paradoxes, none of the suggested approaches have
been able to resolve all of them in the frame of the same theory. Various extensions of utility
theory, based on constructing non-expected utility functionals (Machina, 2008), do not resolve
these paradoxes, as has been proved by Safra and Segal (2008). Usually, extending the classical
utility theory “ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistencies than it resolves” (Al-
Najjar and Weinstein, 2009). In order to stress that the necessity of advancing a novel variant
of decision theory, the QDT presented here, is not just “theory-driven” but is fundamentally
“problem-driven”, with the aim of resolving the existing paradoxes, we describe below some of
the most often discussed paradoxes occurring in classical decision making.
2.1 Allais paradox
The Allais paradox expresses the observation that several decisions which are mutually incom-
patible, according to classical utility theory, are nevertheless embraced by real human people
(Allais, 1953). The mathematical structure of this paradox is as follows. One considers four
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alternatives corresponding to four prospects. For example, let us consider the actions An corre-
sponding to the n-th choice procedure (prospect), with n taking the values 1, 2, 3 and 4. Let the
Xj’s be the amounts of money to be gained with the corresponding probabilities pn(Xj). The
utility function, measuring the utility of getting an amount Xj of money is U(Xj). According
to utility theory, a prospect pin is characterized by a lottery {pn(Xj), U(Xj)}. The expected
utility of the prospect pin is
U(pin) =
∑
j
pn(Xj)U(Xj) . (1)
One also assumes the balance condition among the four prospects:
p1(Xj) + p3(Xj) = p2(Xj) + p4(Xj) for all j . (2)
In the Allais paradox, subjects prefer pi1 to pi2 which, according to utility theory, implies that
U(pi1) > U(pi2) . (3)
And pi3 is preferred or indifferent to pi4, which means that
U(pi3) ≥ U(pi4) . (4)
Using the definition of the expected utility (1), one has from (3) the equation
∑
j
[p1(Xj)− p2(Xj)]U(Xj) > 0 , (5)
while from Eq. (4) one gets
∑
j
[p3(Xj)− p4(Xj)]U(Xj) ≥ 0 . (6)
Using the balance condition (2), the latter inequality transforms into
∑
j
[p1(Xj)− p2(Xj)]U(Xj) ≤ 0 . (7)
Equations (5) and (7) are evidently incompatible.
In the original Allais paradox, the amounts of money were chosen so that U(X1) < U(X2) <
U(X3), with X1 → $0, X2 → $10
6, and X3 → $5× 10
6. The probabilities pn(Xj) were defined
as
{p1(Xj)} = {0, 1, 0} , {p2(Xj)} = {0.01, 0.89, 0.10} , (8)
{p3(Xj)} = {0.90, 0, 0.10} , {p4(Xj)} = {0.89, 0.11, 0} . (9)
The balance condition (2) here is valid, since
p1(X1) + p3(X1) = p2(X1) + p4(X1) = 0.9 ,
p1(X2) + p3(X2) = p2(X2) + p4(X2) = 1 ,
p1(X3) + p3(X3) = p2(X3) + p4(X3) = 0.1 .
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Decisions, when the prospect pi1 is preferred to pi2 and the prospect pi3 is preferred to pi4, are
clearly incompatible. The explanation of this paradox, in the framework of QDT, will be given
in Sec. 9, being based on the fact that the prospect pi2 is more uncertain than pi1, while the
prospects pi3 and pi4 are of a comparable uncertainty.
The balance condition (2) also leads to the violation of the independence axiom of expected
utility theory. This axiom postulates that if the prospect pi1 is strictly preferred to pi2, and the
prospect pi3 is preferred or indifferent to pi4, in the sense of conditions (3) and (4), then the
prospect pi1 + pi3 is strictly preferred to pi2 + pi4, so that
U(pi1 + pi3) > U(pi2 + pi4) . (10)
However, under the balance condition (2), one has
U(pi1 + pi3) = U(pi2 + pi4) . (11)
Equations (10) and (11) violate the independence axiom of utility theory. This anomaly will
be resolved in Proposition 6.
2.2 Ellsberg paradox
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that no utility function can describe the choices made by
real human agents for the following process (Ellsberg, 1961). One considers two prospects pi1
and pi2, defined as the conjunctions pin = AnX , with X = X1 +X2 + . . .. And one assumes the
validity of the equivalence condition
p1(Xj) = p2(Xj) (∀j) . (12)
Under this condition, the expected utility functions (1) for both prospects pi1 and pi2 coincide,
U(pi1) = U(pi2) . (13)
This equality holds for arbitrary utility functions. But in the realization of this paradox,
one defines the probabilities p1(Xj) explicitly, while keeping the value of p2(Xj) unknown or,
perhaps better said, ambiguous. This ambiguity does not remove the fact that condition (12)
holds true. But the value of p2(Xj) is perceived less clearly or, using different framing of the
decision making process, pi2 is organized as a more uncertain prospect than pi1. It turns out
that subjects always prefer pi1 to pi2, which necessarily implies
U(pi1) > U(pi2) , (14)
if classical utility theory is to describe this situation. But, Eqs. (13) and (14) are in contradic-
tion with each other, which implies that there are no utility functions that would satisfy both
these equations simultaneously.
Such a paradox does not arise in QDT, as will be proved in Proposition 7.
7
2.3 Kahneman-Tversky paradox
The logical meaning of the Kahneman-Tversky paradox is as follows (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). One considers four prospects, pin = AnX , with n = 1, 2, 3, 4 and the structure is as in the
Ellsberg paradox above. The actions An characterize the choices, enumerated with n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The alternatives Xj describe the amounts of money which are such that U(X1) < U(X2) <
U(X3) and
U(X2) =
1
2
[U(X1) + U(X3)] . (15)
The probabilities pn(Xj) are given in such a way that
U(pin) = const (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) , (16)
with the expected utility function defined as in Eq. (1).
The procedure is organized so that the prospect pi1 provides a more uncertain gain than pi2,
hence, pi1 is more uncertain that pi2. And the prospect pi4 is defined as yielding more certain
loss than pi3, consequently, pi4 is more repulsive than pi3. In response to the involved risks, real
human subjects prefer pi2 to pi1 and pi3 to pi4, which implies
U(pi1) < U(pi2) , U(pi3) > U(pi4) , (17)
in contradiction with Eq. (16).
In the original Kahneman-Tversky paradox (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), the probability
sets were defined as
{p1(Xj)} = {0.5, 0, 0.5} = {p3(Xj)} , {p2(Xj)} = {0, 1, 0} = {p4(Xj)} .
The Kahneman-Tversky paradox does not occur in QDT, as will be proven in Proposition
9.
3 Intended Actions and Prospects
Decision making is concerned with the choice between several intended actions that, for brevity,
can be called intentions or just actions. The analog of actions in classical probability theory
is the notion of events forming a field of events. In contrast, in QDT, actions are not nec-
essarily commutative and, generally, do not compose a field. Noncommutativity of actions
in QDT is similar to the noncommutativity of events in noncommutative probability theory
(Vioculescu et al., 1992). This echoes the general observation that intended actions in real life
are also very often noncommutative. It is interesting to note that Pierce (1880) was, probably,
the first to emphasize that logical statements are generally noncommutative. The formalization
of his relative logic (Pierce, 1880) is based on the recognition that the order of logical state-
ments can be essential. We start from these premises to describe and analyze the algebra of
actions within QDT. In the Introduction, we have described the main ideas of QDT in simple
words. In what follows, we turn to a more rigorous consideration in the style widely accepted
in economic literature and in the literature on mathematics of complex systems.
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3.1 Action ring
Let us consider a set of intended actions
A = {An : n = 1, 2, . . .} , (18)
where the actions are enumerated with the index n = 1, 2, . . .. It is natural to require the
validity of the binary operation addition, such that for every A,B ∈ A their sum A + B ∈ A.
The sum A + B means that either the action A or action B, or both, are intended to be
accomplished, hence A + B = B + A. The addition is assumed to be associative, so that for
any A,B,C ∈ A, one has A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C. By direct extension, the addition is
defined as a reversible operation, such that from A+B = C it follows that A = C −B. Thus,
the elements of the action set (18) form the action group, which is an Abel group with respect
to addition.
Another natural binary operation for the action of set (18) is multiplication, when for any
A,B ∈ A, there exists AB ∈ A. The product of actions AB implies that both actions are
intended to occur together. The multiplication can be defined as a distributive operation, for
which A(B + C) = AB + AC. However, since the order of the actions can be important, the
multiplication, in general, is not commutative, so that AB is not necessarily the same as BA.
When writing AB, we mean that the action B is to be accomplished before A. This makes it
painless to define the associative triple product ABC = (AB)C = A(BC). The zero element
0 can be introduced as that satisfying the equalities A · 0 = 0 · A = 0 for any A ∈ A. This
element characterizes an empty action, that is, an impossible action. If one would assume that
the action set (18) does not contain the divisors of zero, so that AB 6= 0 for any nonzero A and
B, then the nonzero elements of set (18) would form a groupoid with respect to multiplication.
However, this is not the case as the action set (18) does indeed contain divisors of zero: any
product of two disjoint actions, by definition, is an empty action, so that mutually disjoint
actions are divisors of zero with respect to each other. By this definition, two nonzero actions
are disjoint if and only if their intersection is an empty action.
The described properties characterize the action set (18) as a noncommutative ring, which
will be called the action ring. A set of subsets of A, closed with respect to countable unions
and complementations, is a σ-ring, and if A pertains to this set, it is a σ-field. For the purpose
of developing our QDT, we need to specify some constructions that can be formed with the
actions belonging to the action ring A.
3.2 Action modes
In decision theory, an intended action can possess several representations corresponding to
different particular ways of realizing this action. Such a composite action takes the form of the
union
An ≡
Mn⋃
µ=1
Anµ (Anµ ∈ A) , (19)
whose partial terms are the action modes, with Mn ≥ 1 being the number of modes. When
Mn = 1, the action (19) is simple.
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3.3 Action prospects
A more complicated structure is an action prospect, which is an intersection
pin ≡
⋂
j
Anj (Anj ⊂ An ⊂ A) (20)
of the actions Anj from a subset An of the action ring A. The actions in the product (20) can
be either simple or composite as in the union (19). The difference between AnJ in (20) and
Anµ in (19) is that the former can be a composite action, while the latter is a simple action
representing a single action mode.
3.4 Elementary prospects
The simplest structure among the action prospects (20) corresponds to the prospects including
only the simple single-mode actions or separate modes of composite actions. Let {jn}α be a set
of indices labelling simple actions or separate modes. The elementary prospect is the product
eα ≡
⋂
n
Anjn (jn ∈ {jn}α) , (21)
where each Anjn is simple and enters only one of the prospects, so that different elementary
prospects are disjoint in the sense that their conjunction is an empty action, eαeβ = 0 (α 6= β).
3.5 Prospect lattice
For use as a decision theory, it is important that the set of all possible prospects could be in
some sense ordered. Suppose that the set {pin} of admissible prospects can be organized so
that, for each two prospects from {pin}, an ordering binary relation ≤ can be defined. Then for
each pair pi1 and pi2, one should have either pi1 ≤ pi2 or pi2 ≤ pi1. The ordering relation is linear,
such that pi1 ≤ pi2 implies pi2 ≥ pi1. And it is transitive, so that, if pi1 ≤ pi2 and pi2 ≤ pi3, then
pi1 ≤ pi3. Such a partially ordered manifold {pin} composes a lattice.
The lattice is assumed to be complete, containing the minimal and the maximal elements,
for which
inf
n
pin ≡ 0 , sup
n
pin ≡ pi∗ . (22)
Thus, we obtain a complete lattice of partially ordered prospects,
L ≡ {pin : 0 ≤ pin ≤ pi∗} , (23)
named the prospect lattice. An explicit ordering procedure will be defined below.
4 Mode and Prospect States
The notion of states is crucial in quantum theory (Glimm and Jaffe, 1981). And it is equally
important in QDT. In order to represent the quantum-mechanical states, we shall employ the
Dirac notation (Dirac, 1958, 1967), which allows for a very compact representation of formulas.
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4.1 Mode states
For every single mode Anj of an action An, we put into correspondence a state |Anj >, which
is a function A → C. A conjugate state (in the sense of a Hermitian conjugate) is denoted as
< Anj|, and will be necessary in the definition of the scalar product and for introducing the
probability operators associated with intentions and prospects. For each two mode states, a
scalar product is defined as < Ani|Anj >, which is a function A × A → C. The mode states
can be normalized to one, and they are assumed to be orthogonal, so that
< Ani|Anj > = δij ,
where δij is the Kronecker symbol. The orthogonality here reflects the fact that the action
modes Ani and Anj for i 6= j represent incompatible actions.
4.2 Mode space
The closed linear envelope, spanning all mode states, composes the mode space
Mn ≡ Span{|Anj >: j = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn} . (24)
The dimensionality of Mn is dimMn = Mn. For each two elements |A > and |B > of M, a
scalar product is defined enjoying the property < A|B >=< B|A >∗, where the symbol ∗ de-
notes the complex conjugate, and possessing all other properties characterizing scalar products.
That is, the mode space (24) is a Hilbert space.
4.3 Basic states
Using the mode states |Anj >, it is possible to construct the states of the elementary prospects
(21) as functions A×A× . . .×A → C,
|eα > ≡ |A1j1A2j2 . . . > ≡
⊗
n
|Anjn > , (25)
where jn ∈ {jn}α. The states (25) are termed the basic states. Their scalar product is given as
< eα|eβ > =
∏
n
< Anin|Anjn > ,
where in ∈ {in}α and jn ∈ {jn}β. Given the orthonormality of the mode states, one has
< eα|eβ > = δαβ .
The orthonormality of the basic states again reflects the fact that two elementary prospects eα
and eβ are incompatible for α 6= β.
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4.4 Space of mind
The space of mind, or mind space, is the closed linear envelope
M≡ Span{|eα >} =
⊗
n
Mn , (26)
spanning all basic states (25). Its dimensionality is
dimM =
∏
n
dimMn . (27)
The space of mind (26) is a Hilbert space, represented as a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces
Mn. If the number of Hilbert spaces Mn is infinite, the space (26) is understood as a von
Neumann infinite tensor product (von Neumann, 1938).
4.5 Strategic state of mind
The strategic state of mind |ψs > is a normalized vector of M. As any vector of the Hilbert
space (26), it can be expanded over the basic states (25),
|ψs > =
∑
α
c(eα)|eα > . (28)
The normalization condition reads as
< ψs|ψs > =
∑
α
|c(eα)|
2 = 1 . (29)
The strategic state of mind characterizes the mind of the considered decision maker, describing
the latter as a particular being, with his/her specific features as well as with the concrete
available information (Dixit and Besley, 1997). Each decision maker possesses his/her own
strategic state. We stress that this strategic state of mind |ψs > is specific of a person at a
given time and may display temporal evolution, according to different homeostatic processes
adjusting the individual to the changing environment (Dawkins, 2006).
4.6 Prospect states
To each action prospect (20), one can put into correspondence a prospect state |pin > ∈ M.
As any member of M, it can be expanded over the basic states (25),
|pin > =
∑
α
bn(eα)|eα > . (30)
The states (30) do not need to be neither orthogonal nor normalized, which assumes that
different prospects are not necessarily disjoint, but could be realized together in the probabilistic
sense described below.
For the empty prospect, there corresponds the vacuum state, or empty state |0 >, such that
< 0|eα > = < eα|0 > = 0
for any basic state |eα > ∈M.
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5 Probability Operator Measure
In order to introduce a probability operator measure, we consider the set of prospects forming
a complete lattice. Specifying a prospect as a composite action, we keep in mind that real
decisions are usually made by choosing among composite actions, but not among simple struc-
tureless actions. As we show below, the existence of internal structures within prospects has
consequences of great importance for applications.
Let Σ(L) be a set of subsets of the prospect lattice L, closed under countable unions and
complementations. Then Σ(L) is a σ-ring of L. And let B(M) be the set of all bounded linear
positive operators on the Hilbert space M. Let us consider a positive mapping Pˆ : Σ(L) →
B(M) enjoying the following properties. For an empty prospect,
Pˆ (0) = 0ˆ , (31)
where 0ˆ is the zero operator in B(M). The mapping Pˆ is self-adjoint, so that for any pin ∈ L,
one has
Pˆ+(pin) = Pˆ (pin) , (32)
where the cross implies the Hermitian conjugate. A mapping Pˆ , satisfying conditions (31) and
(32), is an operator measure.
Including L in Σ(L) makes the latter a σ-field. Then Pˆ (L) can be defined as a unity
operator. In what follows, we assume that it is a unity operator in the weak sense, with respect
to the matrix elements of the strategic state:
< ψs|Pˆ (L)|ψs >= 1 . (33)
An operator measure, satisfying conditions (31), (32), and (33), is the probability operator
measure {L,Σ(L), Pˆ}. More information on operator measures can be found, for instance, in
the book (Berberian, 1966).
In our case, the probability operator measure Pˆ is defined on the σ-ring Σ(L) of the prospect
lattice L = {pin}. This probability operator measure includes the probability operators of the
prospects Pˆ (pin). The latter can be represented in the Dirac notation as
Pˆ (pin) ≡ |pin >< pin| . (34)
The prospect probability operators (34) are similar to projection operators, but are not
exactly projectors as they lack the property of being idempotent. In addition, the operators
(34) are not commutative. But it is known (Benioff, 1972a,b,c) that the operators of such
measures do not need to be neither projection operators nor have to commute with each other.
The set of all probability operators (34), over the field of complex numbers C, forms the
algebra of probability operators
P ≡
{
Pˆ (pin) : pin ∈ L
}
. (35)
The involution in P is defined as the Hermitian conjugation. Since operators (34) are self-
adjoint, the involution in P is a bijection. Thus, P is an involutive bijective algebra.
A property of the probability operators (34), which is of importance for QDT, is that Pˆ (pin)
is, generally, an entangling operator. One should not confuse entangled states and entangling
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operators. Entangled states are those that cannot be represented as tensor products of par-
tial states (Keyl, 2002; Nielsen and Chuang, 2000; Williams and Clearwater, 1998). Entangling
operations are those that produce entangled states, even when acting on disentangled states
(Yukalov, 2003a,b,c). Entangling operations in decision theory are of great importance, result-
ing in a variety of nontrivial effects. The entangling property of the probability operators (34)
is due to the composite structure of the action prospects pin.
6 Prospect Operators as Observables
The algebra of the probability operators (35) is analogous to the algebra of local observables in
quantum theory (Bratelli and Robinson, 1979; Dixmier, 1969; Emch, 1972). In quantum theory,
observable quantities are defined as the expectation values, or averages, of the operators over
the algebra of local observables. The complete set of these expectations composes the statistical
state of a quantum system.
The observable quantities in QDT are the expectation values of the probability operators,
which define the scalar probability measure. The expectation value of a probability operator
Pˆ (pin), under the strategic state of mind |ψs >, is
< Pˆ (pin) > ≡ < ψs|Pˆ (pin)|ψs > . (36)
The corresponding observable quantity is the prospect probability
p(pin) ≡ < Pˆ (pin) > . (37)
Taking into account the explicit form of the probability operator (34), from Eqs. (36) and (37),
we have
p(pin) = | < pin|ψs > |
2 . (38)
This expression shows that p(pin) is evidently non-negative. Of course, the normalization con-
dition ∑
n
p(pin) = 1 (39)
is imposed, where the summation is over all pin ∈ L. Thus, the mapping (37) defines the scalar
probability measure p : L → [0, 1].
Definition 6.1. The probability p(pin) of a prospect pin ∈ L is the expectation value (37) of
the probability operator (34), with normalization condition (39).
The scalar probability measure, introduced above, makes it possible to realize the ordering
of the prospects in the prospect lattice L, classifying them as follows.
Definition 6.2. Two prospects, pi1 and pi2 from the prospect lattice L, are indifferent
(pi1 = pi2) if and only if
p(pi1) = p(pi2) (pi1 = pi2) . (40)
Definition 6.3. Between two prospects pi1 and pi2 belonging to the prospect lattice L, the
prospect pi1 is preferred to pi2 (pi1 > pi2) if and only if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) . (41)
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Definition 6.4. A prospect pi∗ ≡ supn pin from the prospect lattice L is optimal if and only
if the related prospect probability is the largest:
p(pi∗) = sup
n
p(pin) ⇐⇒ (pi∗ = sup
n
pin) . (42)
Definition 6.5. The procedure of decision making in QDT consists of the enumeration of
the possible action prospects, the evaluation of the prospect probabilities, and the choice of the
optimal prospect.
7 Interference of Composite Prospects
The decision procedure described in the previous section, when applied to composite prospects
containing composite actions, results in nontrivial consequences, often connected to the fact
that the probability operators (34) for composite prospects correspond to entangling opera-
tions (Yukalov, 2003a,b,c). Several modes of a composite action can interfere, leading to the
appearance of interference terms. The occurrence of several modes of an action implies the
existence of uncertainty and of the perception of possible harmful consequences. In contrast,
the elementary prospects (21) yield no interference. This is because the states of the elementary
prospects are the basic states (25).
7.1 Composite prospects
It is important to distinguish between composite and simple prospects, since these have different
properties related to their structure.
Definition 7.1 A prospect pin ∈ L is composite if and only if it is formed by not less than
two actions and at least one of its forming actions is composite.
The prospect state (30) can be represented as a superposition
|pin > =
∑
α
|pin(eα) > (43)
of the partial weighted states of the elementary prospects,
|pin(eα) > ≡ bn(eα)|eα > . (44)
The probability of such a weighted elementary prospect, under the strategic state of mind
|ψs >∈M, according to Eq. (38), is
pn(eα) ≡ | < pin(eα)|ψs > |
2 . (45)
Taking into account Eqs. (28) and (44) gives
pn(eα) = |bn(eα) c(eα)|
2 . (46)
To be classified as a probability, pn(eα) is to be normalized, so that
∑
n,α
pn(eα) = 1 , (47)
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which will be always assumed in what follows. The peculiarity of dealing with composite
prospects is that the prospect probability p(pin), generally, is not a sum of the partial probabil-
ities (46).
Proposition 1. The probability of a composite prospect pin ∈ L, under the strategic state
of mind |ψs >∈M, is the sum
p(pin) =
∑
α
pn(eα) + q(pin) (48)
of the partial probabilities of the weighted elementary prospects (46) plus the quantum interfer-
ence term
q(pin) ≡
∑
α6=β
b∗n(eα)c(eα)c
∗(eβ)bn(eβ) . (49)
Proof: Formula (48) follows from the definition of the prospect probability (37), or (38),
with the substitutions of Eqs. (28) and (30), and with the use of notations (46) and (49).
The use of quantum techniques for defining the prospect probability yields the appearance
in QDT of the effects typical of quantum theory, such as interference and entanglement. The
interference effect in QDT is analogous to the interference in quantum mechanics (Feynman,
1965). In QDT, interference happens only for composite prospects, containing actions repre-
sented by several modes. Therefore it involves interferences between modes.
The entanglement effect may have two different origins. First, the state of mind |ψs > can be
expected in general to be entangled. But more important is that the probability operator (34),
generally, is an entangling operator, which can create entangled states even from disentangled
ones (Yukalov, 2003a,b,c). This is somewhat similar to the generation of entanglement in
the transfer of information through quantum channels (Keyl, 2002; Nielsen and Chuang, 2000;
Williams and Clearwater, 1998).
There exists several measures of entanglement (Keyl, 2002; Nielsen and Chuang, 2000;
Williams and Clearwater, 1998) and of entanglement production (Yukalov, 2003a,b,c). It is
important to stress that the degree of entanglement is correlated with the level of order in the
considered system (Yukalov, 2003c). This is especially clear if the system order is classified by
means of the order indices (Coleman and Yukalov, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996), which can be intro-
duced for arbitrary operators (Yukalov, 2002), and in particular, for reduced density matrices
(Coleman and Yukalov, 2000). Generally speaking, the notions of order and entanglement are
complementary to each other (Yukalov, 2003c). The more a system is ordered, the less it is
entangled.
In decision theory, the presence of disorder is equivalent to the existence of uncertainty, and
the latter is accompanied by risk (Epstein, 1999; Malevergne and Sornette, 2006). Keeping in
mind the above discussion, we can associate the interference term (49) with the uncertainty
caused by the presence of several modes representing one action as well as with the perception
of potential harmful consequences accompanying the decision-making process occurring under
uncertainty.
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7.2 Aversion to uncertainty and loss
The following definitions give an explicit formulation of the principle of “aversion to uncertainty
and loss”, which replaces the principle of risk aversion, as being necessary to understand and
explain the decision making processes of real human beings. The interference term q(pin),
defined in (49), characterizes the subjective attitude of a decision maker with respect to the
considered prospect pin. This includes the appreciation of the prospect as being potentially more
or less uncertain or harmful, as a result of which the decision maker can look to the prospect as
being more or less attractive. Comparing the terms in (48), we can distinguish them as having
different meanings. The first, additive, term, represented by the sum, defines the objective
quantitative characteristic of the considered prospect, showing its usefulness. While the second,
interference, term q(pin) describes the subjective qualitative feature of the prospect, showing how
much the latter is subjectively attractive. This understanding is formalized in the definitions
below.
Definition 7.2. The interference term q(pin), defined in (49), characterizes the subjective
attractiveness, or the quality, of the prospect pin, because of which it can be called the attraction,
or quality, factor.
Definition 7.3. Two prospects, pi1 and pi2 from L, are equally attractive, or are of equal
quality, if and only if
q(pi1) = q(pi2) .
This implies that they are perceived as equally uncertain or as potentially equally harmful.
Definition 7.4. Between two prospects, pi1 and pi2 from L, the prospect pi1 is termed more
attractive, or of better quality, if and only if
q(pi1) > q(pi2) .
This means that pi2 is perceived as more uncertain or potentially more harmful than pi1.
From these definitions and formula (48), it follows that the more uncertain or potentially
more harmful prospect pi2 possesses a smaller interference term q(pi1), thus, diminishing the
probability p(pi2). The stronger perceived uncertainty or potential harm suppresses the prospect
probability. The prospect probability p(pin) is composed of two terms, one defining the useful-
ness of the prospect and another characterizing the attractiveness of the latter. In selecting an
optimal prospect, subjects try to avoid potential harm and choose the prospect that is more
useful and, at the same time, more attractive, or has a subjectively better quality. The prob-
ability of choosing this or that prospect is based on the total value of p(pin), as is defined in
Definitions 6.2 and 6.3.
In order for the previous definitions to be applicable to real decision processes, it is necessary
to specify the notion of uncertainty and of perceived potential harm by formulating a sufficient
condition for one of the prospects to be treated as more uncertain or more potentially harmful
than another.
Definition 7.5. Between two prospects, pi1 and pi2 from L, the prospect pi1 is said to be
more attractive if pi1 possesses at least one of the following features, as compared to pi2:
(a) getting more certain gain,
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(b) getting more uncertain loss,
(c) being active under certainty,
(d) being passive under uncertainty.
In other words, pi2 is perceived as more uncertain or potentially more harmful than pi1.
Remark 7.1. The notions of “gain” and “loss” are assumed to have the standard meaning
accepted in the literature on decision making. The same concerns the notions of “being active”
and “being passive”. The notion “being active” implies that the decision maker chooses to
accomplish an act. While “being passive” means that the decision maker restrains from an
action. For instance, in the Hamlet hesitation “to be or not to be”, the first option “to be”
implies activity, while the second possibility “not to be” means passivity.
Remark 7.2. Note that (b) is the double negation of (a), and (d) is the double negation
of (c). Hence, from the point of view of mathematical logic (Mendelson, 1963), the statements
(a) and (b) are equivalent, as are (d) and (c).
Remark 7.3. We are careful to distinguish the concept of “uncertainty or perceived po-
tential harm” from “risk”. Risk involves the combination of the uncertainty of a loss and of
the severity or amplitude of that loss. In contrast, uncertainty and perceived potential harm
that we consider in QDT emphasize more the subjective pain that a human subject visualizes
in his/her mind when considering the available options and making a decision.
7.3 Interference alternation
The attraction factors enjoy a very important property, without which it would be impossible
to resolve the paradoxes occurring in the classical decision making.
Proposition 2. Let us consider a lattice L of prospects pin, with the prospect states |pin >
∈M, under the normalization conditions (39) and (47). Then
∑
n
q(pin) = 0 . (50)
Proof: Summing the prospect probabilities (48) over all pin ∈ L, and using the normalization
conditions (39) and (47) yields (50).
Remark 7.4. The interference alternation (50) shows that some of the interference terms
are positive, while other are negative, so that the total sum of all these terms is zero. This means
that the probability of prospects with larger uncertainty and/or perceived potential harm will
be suppressed, while that of less uncertain and/or harmful prospects will be enhanced.
8 Binary Prospect Lattices
In the majority of applications, one considers the structures that are equivalent to a binary
lattice L = {pi1, pi2}, containing two composite prospects. In order to address these applications,
we specify below the above mathematical structure to the case of a binary lattice.
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8.1 Binary lattice
Suppose that A and X are the actions from the action ring A. And let A contain just two
modes,
A = A1 + A2 . (51)
While X ∈ A can include M2 ≥ 2 modes,
X =
M2⋃
j=1
Xj (M2 ≥ 2) . (52)
The mind dimensionality is therefore dimM = 2M2. The elementary prospects AnXj define
the basic states |AnXj >, with n = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . . ,M2. The strategic state of mind (28)
takes the form
|ψs > =
∑
nj
c(AnXj)|AnXj > . (53)
Let the prospect lattice L = {pin} consist of two prospects
pin ≡ AnX (n = 1, 2) . (54)
The prospect states (30) read as
|pin > =
∑
j
b(AnXj)|AnXj > . (55)
The probabilities of elementary prospects (46) are now
p(AnXj) = |b(AnXj)c(AnXj)|
2 , (56)
with their normalization condition (47) written as
∑
nj
p(AnXj) = 1 . (57)
The quantum interference term (49) becomes
q(pin) =
∑
i 6=j
b∗(AnXi)c(AnXi)c
∗(AnXj)b(AnXj) . (58)
Then the prospect probability (38) yields
p(pin) =
∑
j
p(AnXj) + q(pin) , (59)
in agreement with formula (48). And the normalization condition (39) reduces to
p(pi1) + p(pi2) = 1 . (60)
The theorem on interference alternation (Proposition 2) leads to the equality
q(pi1) + q(pi2) = 0 . (61)
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This case of a binary prospect lattice L = {pi1, pi2} explicitly demonstrates that the quantum
interference term (58) is caused by the occurrence of the composite action (52) making prospects
(54) composite. The interference between several modes reflects an uncertainty and/or a per-
ceived potential harm accompanying the choice of one of the modes representing the composite
action.
From the principle of “aversion to uncertainty and loss” (Definitions 7.3 and 7.4), one can
conclude the following. If the prospects pi1 and pi2 are perceived as equally uncertain and/or
potentially harmful, then the theorem on interference alternation (61) yields q(pi1) = q(pi2) = 0.
And when one of the prospects, say pi2, is more uncertain and/or potentially harmful than
pi1, then, by Definition 7.5 and equality (61), one has
q(pi1) = −q(pi2) > 0 , q(pi1) = |q(pi2)| > 0 . (62)
8.2 Conditional probabilities
Let us consider two actions, A and X from the action ring A, with the action A being arbitrary
and the action X being composite as in notation (52). By the definition of the action ring
A, an action AXj implies joining two actions A and Xj to be accomplished together, with
the probability p(AXj). The related conditional probability p(A|Xj) can be introduced in the
standard manner (Feller, 1970) through the identity
p(AXj) ≡ p(A|Xj) p(Xj) . (63)
Here p(Xj) is a prescribed weight of the action Xj , satisfying the conditions
∑
j
p(Xj) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(Xj) ≤ 0 . (64)
Interchanging in identity (63) the actions A and Xj, one gets
p(XjA) ≡ p(Xj |A) p(A) , (65)
where p(A) ≡ p(AX) is assumed. The above relations can be formalized as follows.
Definition 8.1. For the actions A and X from the action ring A, where A is arbitrary
and X is a composite action given by Eq. (52), the conditional probability p(A|Xj) of A under
condition Xj and the conditional probability p(Xj|A) of Xj under condition A are defined by
the equations
p(A|Xj) ≡
p(AXj)
p(Xj)
, p(Xj|A) ≡
p(XjA)
p(AX)
, (66)
where the weights p(Xj) satisfy normalization (64).
It is worth emphasizing that p(A|Xj) does not equal p(Xj|A). Recall that this is so already
in classical probability theory (Feller, 1970). There is even less reason to expect their equality in
QDT. The relation between the conditional probabilities (66) is given by the following formula
below.
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Proposition 3. The conditional probabilities p(A|Xj) and p(Xj|A), defined in Eq. (66),
satisfy the relation
p(Xj|A) =
p(XjA)∑
j p(A|Xj)p(Xj) + q(AX)
. (67)
Proof: Let us consider the prospect AX , with an arbitrary A and with the composite X
given by Eq. (52). Then, according to Eq. (59), the corresponding prospect probability is
p(AX) =
∑
j
p(AXj) + q(AX) .
Substituting this into the second of Eqs. (66) and using Eq. (63), we come to relation (67).
Remark 8.1. Formula (67) is the generalization of the Bayes’ formula of classical proba-
bility theory (Feller, 1970). Equation (67) reduces to the Bayes formula, provided that there is
no interference, when q(AX) is zero, and that the actions pertain to a field where all actions
are commutative. However, in QDT, the actions belong to a noncommutative ring A, so that
in general p(AXj) and p(XjA) are not equal, since AXj is not the same as XjA. As already
mentioned, the noncommutativity of actions is an important feature of QDT.
8.3 Noncommutativity of actions
Since the action ring A is not commutative with respect to multiplication, the prospects AX
and XA from L are generally different, in the sense that p(AX) does not coincide with p(XA).
Proposition 4. Let us consider two prospects AX and XA in L, with A ∈ A being arbitrary
and X being a composite action given in Eq. (52). And let at least one of the action modes Xj
be certainly realized under action A so that
∑
j
p(Xj |A) = 1 . (68)
Then the prospects AX and XA are indifferent (AX = XA) if and only if there is no mode
interference, that is,
p(AX) = p(XA) , (69)
if and only if
q(AX) = q(XA) = 0 . (70)
Proof: For the prospect XA, invoking the general procedure, we have
p(XA) =
∑
j
p(XjA) + q(XA) .
Employing here the definition of the conditional probabilities (66) gives
p(XA) =
∑
j
p(Xj |A) p(AX) + q(XA) .
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Using normalization (68) yields
p(XA)− p(AX) = q(XA) .
Interchanging the actions A and X results in
p(AX)− p(XA) = q(AX) .
From the latter two equations, we obtain the statement formalized in Eqs. (69) and (70).
Remark 8.2. This theorem emphasizes the intimate relation between the noncommutativ-
ity of actions and the appearance of the interference terms. The action noncommutativity and
the presence of action interference constitute both characteristic features of QDT.
9 Explanation of Classical Paradoxes
A series of paradoxes have been unearthed which cannot find satisfactory explanations within
the framework of classical utility theory. These paradoxes are well documented in a growing
body of empirical evidence. Numerous related citations can be found in the review articles
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Machina, 2008) which provide detailed descriptions of these
paradoxes referring to a voluminous literature. All these studies unambiguously show that
decision makers systematically violate the predictions of classical utility theory, when deci-
sions are made under uncertainty and risk. There have been numerous attempts to treat these
paradoxes by modifying the expected utility theory with introducing some more complicated
unexpected utility functionals (Machina, 2008). However, in addition to being more compli-
cated, ambiguously defined, and spoiling the nice mathematical properties of the expected
utility, such modifications cannot solve all existing paradoxes in the classical decision making,
as has recently been proved (Safra and Segal, 2008).
The existence of such paradoxes in classical utility theory can be traced back to the fact that
the impact of risk and uncertainty is embodied only within the choice of the utility function
of the decision maker, which is supposed to fully capture by its functional shape the risk and
uncertainty aversions of the agent. Given a set of competing actions or prospects, classical
utility theory assumes that one can independently and objectively estimate their corresponding
probabilities. Then, the preferred action is that one which maximizes the expected utility,
where the expectation is performed over all possible scenarios weighted by their corresponding
probabilities. In contrast, QDT takes into account the fact that the existence of competing
actions or prospects in the presence of risk and uncertainty leads to an entanglement of the
probabilities of these different actions, and therefore to distortions away from pure absolute
objective probabilities. The interference terms and the noncommutativity of actions, discussed
above, describe the fact that the probabilities of different actions depend on the coexistence
of other potential actions in the mind of the decision maker. From the point of view of QDT,
this single fact is at the origin of the paradoxes in classical utility theory. Since, as we now
show, QDT is able to account qualitatively and quantitatively for all known classical paradoxes,
this suggests that the axioms of QDT correctly embody at a coarse-grained level the effective
thought processes underlying decision making of real humans.
In the present section, we discuss the main known paradoxes classified as such by classical
utility theory. Naturally, each of these paradoxes can be represented by an infinite number
22
of variants in different real life situations. And a large number of such illustrations has been
described in the literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Machina, 2008). However, from the
point of view of mathematics, there are only a finite number of typical structures. Here, our
aim is specifically to analyze the mathematical structure of these paradoxes, omitting secondary
descriptive details. In so doing, we provide a general demonstration that no such paradox occurs
in the framework of QDT, allowing one to adapt the same reasoning to the many variants of
each paradox.
9.1 Compatibility violation
This paradox, first described by Allais (1953), and now known under his name, is a choice
problem showing an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected
utility theory. It is also often referred to as the violation of the independence axiom of classical
utility theory. This paradox is that two decisions which are incompatible in the framework
of classical utility theory are nevertheless taken by real human agents. The mathematical
structure of the Allais paradox has been presented in Sec. 2. Its explanation in the framework
of QDT is as follows.
Let us consider two composite actions
A =
4⋃
n=1
An , X =
M2⋃
j=1
Xj , (71)
where M2 ≥ 2. Four action prospects
pin ≡ AnX (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) (72)
form a quadruple lattice L = {pin}. Suppose that the prospect ordering is such that pi1 is
strictly preferred to pi2, hence,
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) , (73)
with pi2 being perceived as more uncertain and/or potentially more harmful than pi1, that is,
q(pi2) < q(pi1) . (74)
And let pi3 be preferred, or indifferent, to pi4, so that
p(pi3) ≥ p(pi4) (pi3 ≥ pi4) , (75)
with the prospects pi3 and pi4 being of equal uncertainty and potential harm,
q(pi3) = q(pi4) . (76)
In addition, one assumes the balance condition
p(A1|Xj) + p(A3|Xj) = p(A2|Xj) + p(A4|Xj) . (77)
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In the framework of utility theory, this condition makes incompatible the decisions associated
with the ordering pi1 > pi2 and pi3 ≥ pi4. In other words, this ordering is contradictory (see Sec.
2). But this contradiction does not arise in QDT.
Proposition 5. Let a quadruple lattice L = {pin} of prospects (72) be ordered so that: (i)
pi1 > pi2, in the sense of Eq. (73), with pi2 being more uncertain and/or potentially harmful
than pi1 in the sense of Eq. (74), and (ii) pi3 ≥ pi4 in the sense of Eq. (75), with pi3 and pi4 being
of equal uncertainty and potential perceived harm according to Eq. (76). And let the balance
condition (77) be valid. Then the decisions pi1 > pi2 and pi3 ≥ pi4 are compatible, provided that
0 ≤
∑
j
[p(A2Xj)− p(A1Xj)] < q(pi1)− q(pi2) . (78)
Proof: The probabilities of the prospects (72) read as
p(pin) =
∑
j
p(An|Xj) p(Xj) + q(pin) . (79)
Since pi1 > pi2, in the sense of inequality (73), we have
∑
j
[p(A1|Xj)− p(A2|Xj)] p(Xj) > q(pi2)− q(pi1) . (80)
Because of pi3 ≥ pi4, according to Eq. (75), we get
∑
j
[p(A3|Xj)− p(A4|Xj)] p(Xj) > q(pi4)− q(pi3) . (81)
Equation (80) can be rewritten as
∑
j
[p(A2Xj)− p(A1Xj)] < q(pi1)− q(pi2) . (82)
And Eq. (81), invoking the balance condition (77), transforms into
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] ≤ q(pi3)− q(pi4) . (83)
Taking into account condition (76) reduces Eq. (83) to
∑
j
[p(A2Xj)− p(A1Xj)] ≥ 0 . (84)
Combining Eqs. (82) and (84) yields the desired result (78).
Remark 9.1. In the classical utility theory, there are no interference terms. The reduction
of QDT to classical utility theory is obtained by setting the terms q(pin) to zero. Then, Eq.
(78) becomes a contradiction, which is nothing but the Allais paradox. In QDT, there is no
contradiction (and no paradox) since the right-hand side of Eq. (78) is positive according to
condition (74).
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9.2 Independence paradox
As has been already mentioned, the Allais paradox not only reveals that real human beings can
select decisions which are mutually incompatible within the standard expected utility theory,
but it also shows that the independence axiom of utility theory is violated by real humans.
The independence axiom stipulates that, if pi1 > pi2 and pi3 ≥ pi4, then pi1 + pi3 > pi2 + pi4. The
mathematics of how this independence axiom breaks down is explained in Sec. 2. In contrast,
within QDT, the violation of the independence-axiom does not occur. Instead, we can state
the following independence theorem.
Proposition 6. Let a lattice L = {pin} of six prospects be ordered so that pi1 > pi2, with pi1
being perceived as more uncertain and/or potentially more harmful than pi2, and pi3 ≥ pi4, with
pi3 and pi4 being of equal uncertainty and potential harm. And let pi2 + pi4 be more uncertain
and/or more potentially harmful than or at the same perceived level as pi1 + pi3, so that
q(pi2 + pi4) ≤ q(pi1 + pi3) . (85)
Then the prospect pi1 + pi3 is strictly preferred to pi2 + pi4, that is,
p(pi1 + pi3) > p(pi2 + pi4) . (86)
Proof: By employing the definition of the prospect probabilities defined above, we have
p(pi1 + pi3) ≡ | < pi1 + pi3|ψs > |
2 , p(pi2 + pi4) ≡ | < pi2 + pi4|ψs > |
2 ,
for a given state of mind |ψs >. Straightforward calculations give
p(pi1 + pi3) = p(pi1) + p(pi3) + q(pi1 + pi3) , p(pi2 + pi4) = p(pi2) + p(pi4) + q(pi2 + pi4) .
Using inequalities (73), (75), and (85) yields the above inequality (86).
Remark 9.2. Let us stress that invoking the notion of uncertainty and/or perceived po-
tential harm, which is rigorously related to the occurrence of the interference terms, makes
Proposition 6 a theorem rather than an assumption.
9.3 Utility failure
Another well-known anomaly in the use of utility theory to account for real human decisions
is called the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). It states that, in some cases, no utility function
can be defined at all, so that utility theory fails. The mathematical structure of the Ellsberg
paradox is described in Sec. 2. As we show below, such a paradox does not arise in QDT.
Let us consider two composite actions
A = A1 + A2 , X =
M2⋃
j=1
Xj , (87)
where M2 ≥ 2. The case of interest is the binary lattice L = {pin} of the prospects
pin ≡ AnX (n = 1, 2) . (88)
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The Ellsberg paradox is characterized by the equivalence condition
p(A1|Xj) = p(A2|Xj) (∀j) . (89)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are distinguished by the fact that p(A1|Xj) is given explicitly, while
p(A2|Xj) is not explicitly available, but its existence is just stated. While the structure of the
decision making process is such that (89) holds true, its formulation adds what has been termed
an “ambiguity” for one of the prospects (pi2). Within QDT, this ambiguity is simply taken into
account by saying that pi2 is perceived as more uncertain than pi1 which, according to Definition
7.5, implies
q(pi2) < q(pi1) . (90)
Human subjects are found to decide in favor of the less uncertain prospect pi1, which is usually
preferred to pi2. But, as explained in Sec. 2, the option pi1 > pi2, under condition (89), cannot
be correct with any utility function. In contrast, within QDT, the choice pi1 > pi2 is not merely
admissible but is compulsory, given the structure of the problem. The prediction of QDT for
this problem can be stated under the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let us consider the binary lattice L = {pin} of prospects (88), supplemented
by condition (89). And let pi2 be perceived as more uncertain than pi1. Then pi1 is preferred to
pi2, that is,
p(pi1) > p(pi2) . (91)
Proof: Following the mathematical structure of QDT, we have
p(pi1)− p(pi2) =
∑
j
[p(A1|Xj)− p(A2|Xj)] p(Xj) + q(pi1)− q(pi2) ,
Invoking condition (89) yields
p(pi1)− p(pi2) = q(pi1)− q(pi2) .
Taking into account that pi2 is more uncertain than pi1, in the sense of Eq. (90), we obtain
inequality (91) telling us that pi1 > pi2 (pi1 is preferred to pi2).
Remark 9.3. The reduction of QDT to classical utility theory is obtained, as usual, by
putting the interference terms to zero. In this case, p(pi1) is equal to p(pi2), which is incompatible
with the choice pi1 > pi2 performed by most real human beings, retrieving the Ellsberg paradox.
9.4 Inversion paradox
A large set of paradoxes found when applying classical utility theory to the decision making of
real human beings are related to the unexpected inversion of choice, when decisions are made
in the presence of uncertainty. In other words, the ordering or preference of competing choices
according to classical utility theory is reversed by human beings. For this literature, we refer
to the numerous citations found in Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and Machina (2008). This
anomaly is sometimes called the Rabin paradox (Rabin, 2000).
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Let us consider two composite actions
A =
M1⋃
n=1
An , X =
M2⋃
j=1
Xj , (92)
where M1 ≥ 2 and M2 ≥ 2. The prospect lattice L = {pin} is composed of M1 prospects
pin ≡ AnX (n = 1, 2, . . . ,M1) . (93)
Suppose that the partial probabilities obey the majorization condition
∑
j
p(A1Xj) ≥
∑
j
p(A2Xj) . (94)
From the point of view of classical utility theory, under condition (94), the prospect pi1 should
be preferred or equivalent to pi2. However, subjects often decide in favor of pi2, when pi1 is
perceived as more uncertain than pi2, which contradicts utility theory. But this contradiction
is removed in QDT, as formulated by the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let us consider a lattice L = {pin} of prospects (93). And let condition (94)
be valid. Nevertheless, pi2 is preferred to pi1, that is p(pi2) > p(pi1), when pi1 is more uncertain
than pi2, such that
q(pi2)− q(pi1) >
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] . (95)
Proof: For the difference of the prospect probabilities, we have
p(pi1)− p(pi2) =
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] + q(pi1)− q(pi2) .
This, together with condition (95), gives p(pi2) > p(pi1), which means that pi2 is preferred to pi1.
Remark 9.4. Within classical utility theory, characterized by the absence of interference
terms, condition (95) would result in the inverse conclusion that pi1 is preferred to pi2. The
inversion paradox occurs in situations where subjects would nevertheless opt for pi2 > pi1.
9.5 Invariance violation
This paradox was described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who pointed out that in some
cases utility theory yields the same expected utility outcomes for several prospects, while sub-
jects clearly prefer some prospects to others. The mathematical structure of the Kahneman-
Tversky paradox is explained in Sec. 2.
One considers four composite prospects, as in Eq. (93), under the invariance condition
∑
j
p(AnXj) = const (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) . (96)
Since condition (96) leads to the invariance of the expected utility functions with respect to
permutations or replacements among these four prospects, if subjects were basing their decision
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according to the recipes of classical utility theory, they should be indifferent with respect to
the four choices. However, real human subjects demonstrate evident preference for some of
the prospects, when the choices are accompanied by uncertainty. Kahneman and Tversky
characterize the prospect pi1 as yielding more uncertain gain than pi2. And the prospect pi4 is
defined as resulting in a more certain loss than pi3, that is, pi4 is more potentially harmful than
pi3. Summarizing, one has
q(pi1) < q(pi2) , q(pi4) < q(pi3) . (97)
Under these conditions, there is no paradox remaining within QDT, as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 9. Let us consider a quadruple lattice L = {pin} of the composite prospects
(93), under the invariance condition (96) and uncertainty conditions (97). Then pi2 is preferred
to pi1 and pi3 is preferred to pi4, so that
p(pi2) > p(pi1) , p(pi3) > p(pi4) . (98)
Proof: It is easy to notice that the Kahneman-Tversky paradox is nothing but a slightly
complicated version of the Ellsberg paradox. The Kahneman-Tversky paradox can be treated
as a particular case of the inversion paradox. Therefore the proof of Eqs. (98) is the same as
in Propositions 7 and 8.
Remark 9.5. In classical utility theory, with no interference terms, all prospect probabil-
ities would be the same for all prospects, contradicting inequalities (98). This is the meaning
of the Kahneman-Tversky paradox of invariance violation (see Sec. 2).
9.6 Certainty effects
A number of paradoxes, related to the description of prospects as more or less certain, and
robustly violating expected utility theory, are collectively called certainty effects. Typical ex-
amples of such paradoxes have already been discussed, such as the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg
paradox, and the Kahneman-Tversky paradox, when real human subjects prefer a less uncer-
tain prospect notwithstanding the fact that it has a smaller expected utility. The mathematical
structure of such paradoxes, analyzed in Sec. 2, demonstrates that these paradoxes are associ-
ated with difficulties in discriminating between different reward values.
In addition to these direct certainty effects, there exist reversed certainty effects (Shafir et al.,
2008), when subjects prefer a more uncertain prospect. This happens when rewards are easily
discriminated, being evidently different. The reversed certainty effects can also be explained in
the framework of QDT.
Proposition 10. Let us consider a lattice L = {pin} of prospects defined in Eq. (93).
Suppose that a prospect pi1 is more uncertain or more potentially harmful that pi2, in the sense
that q(pi1) < q(pi2). Despite the fact that the prospect pi1 is more uncertain, it is preferred to pi2
when and only when
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] > q(pi2)− q(pi1) > 0 . (99)
28
Proof: Writing the difference p(pi1)− p(pi2), as in Proposition 8, and requiring that p(pi1) be
larger than p(pi2) yields condition (99).
Remark 9.6. When the left-hand side of Eq. (99) is close to zero, this inequality cannot be
true in the presence of dissimilar uncertainties between the two prospects. Instead, inequality
(95) holds, since, by assumption, q(pi1) < q(pi2). That is, we retrieve the direct certainty effect.
But when the left-hand side of Eq. (99) is sufficiently large, this inequality may become valid,
while Eq. (95) looses its validity. This means that the reversed certainty effect holds true. These
conclusions confirm that the direct certainty effects emerge when it is difficult to discriminate
between rewards, whereas the reversed certainty effects arise when the discrimination of rewards
is easy, in agreement with empirical observations on decision making under uncertainty by
human subjects (Shafir et al., 2008).
9.7 Disjunction effect
The disjunction effect is the violation of the Savage “sure-thing principle” (Savage, 1954).
According to this principle, if an alternative A1 is preferred to an alternative A2, when an
event X1 occurs, and it is also preferred to A2, when an event X2 occurs, then A1 should be
preferred to A2, when it is not known which of the events, either X1 or X2, has happened
(the so-called“sure-thing” principle). In real life, human subjects often violate the sure-thing
principle, this violation being called the disjunction effect. In the literature, there are hundreds
of examples of concrete realizations of the disjunction effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983;
Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Machina, 2008) and references therein), all of them having the same
mathematical structure.
One considers a binary lattice L = {pin} of prospects
pin ≡ AnX , X =
M2⋃
j=1
Xj , (100)
where n = 1, 2 and M2 ≥ 2. The majorization condition
p(A1Xj) > p(A2Xj) (∀j) (101)
is assumed. The Savage “sure-thing principle” (Savage, 1954) states that, under condition
(101), the prospect pi1 must be preferred to pi2. This, however, does not happen when pi1 is
sufficiently more uncertain than pi2, a situation which leads subjects to prefer pi2 over pi1, in
blatant contradiction with the Savage principle. The following proposition shows how this
contradiction is removed within QDT.
Proposition 11. Let us consider a binary lattice L = {pi1, pi2}, with pi1 being more uncertain
than pi2, i.e., q(pi1) < q(pi2). And let the majorization condition (101) be valid. Notwithstanding
this majorization, the prospect pi2 is preferred to pi1, so that p(pi2) > p(pi1), provided that
q(pi2) >
1
2
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] . (102)
Proof: We notice that the majorization condition (101) is a sufficient condition for inequality
(94) to hold, so that the disjunction effect is a particular case of the inversion paradox. Following
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the same proof as in Proposition 8, we get inequality (95) as a condition for pi2 > pi1. Using the
theorem on interference alternation (Proposition 2), which for a binary lattice takes the form
of Eqs. (62), we come to condition (102) under which pi2 > pi1.
Remark 9.7. Equation (102) clearly shows the origin of the disjunction effect, contradicting
the Savage “sure-thing principle”. In classical utility theory, where the interference term q(pi2)
is zero, the left-hand side of Eq. (102) is zero, while the right-hand side, owing to condition
(101), is positive, leading to a contradiction. It is easy to check numerically that condition (102)
always holds when the disjunction effect is observed empirically (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983;
Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Machina, 2008).
9.8 Conjunction fallacy
The conjunction rule of classical probability theory requires that the probability of the conjunc-
tion of two events cannot be larger than any of the probabilities of the separate events forming
the conjunction. However, again, when decisions are made under uncertainty, subjects often reli-
ably violate the conjunction rule, which is termed the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman,
1983). There exist numerous particular examples of this fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983;
Yates and Carlson, 1986; Machina, 2008).
To describe the mathematical structure of the problem, let us consider two composite actions
A and X and a lattice L = {pin} of the prospects
pin ≡ AnX , A =
M1⋃
n=1
An , X =
M2⋃
j=1
X2 , (103)
with M1 ≥ 2 and M2 ≥ 2. In applications, one usually takes M1 and M2 equal to two. But the
mathematical structure of the problem does not change for arbitrary M1 ≥ 2 and M2 ≥ 2. In
classical probability theory, p(pin) can never be smaller than any p(AnXj) for arbitrary n and
j. This is why, when it happens that there is at least one pair of n = n0 and j = j0, such that
subjects support the following inequality,
p(pin0) < p(An0Xj0) , (104)
this is classified as the conjunction fallacy. There can exist several n and j for which the
conjunction fallacy (104) occurs. The most general case is when there is at least one n0, for
which condition (104) holds true, with j0 corresponding to the largest partial probability, such
that
p(An0Xj0) ≡ sup
j
p(An0Xj) . (105)
In QDT, the conjunction-fallacy paradox finds a natural explanation, if decisions are made in
the presence of uncertainty.
Proposition 12. Let us consider a lattice L = {pin} of prospects defined in Eqs. (103).
The conjunction fallacy, in the sense of inequality (104), happens when and only when there
exists at least one uncertain prospect pin0 ∈ L, for which
q(pin0) < −
∑
j(6=j0)
p(An0Xj) . (106)
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Proof: From the difference
p(pin0)− p(An0Xj0) =
∑
j
p(An0Xj) − p(An0Xj0) + q(pin0)
it follows that inequality (106) is the necessary and sufficient condition for Eq. (104) to be
true.
Remark 9.8. As has been stressed above, the reduction to classical probability theory
can be done by setting all interference terms q(pin) to zero. But then inequality (106) could
never be true, showing that the conjunction fallacy is a real paradox in the framework of the
classical theory. In QDT, as we have numerically checked in a number of concrete examples,
condition (106) always holds in the situations where the conjunction fallacy has been observed
with human subjects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Machina, 2008).
9.9 Isolation effect
The isolation effect is a common name for a large variety of phenomena known under differ-
ent guises, such as the focusing effect, the availability effect, the salience effect, the framing
effect, or elicitation effect (McCaffery and Baron, 2006). The essence of all these phenom-
ena is that, when choosing among several alternatives, subjects are more inclined towards the
certain benefits and at the same time they prefer the prospects with more uncertain losses.
For instance, there exists a well documented tendency to prefer hidden to transparent taxes
(McCaffery and Baron, 2006). Subjects tend to prefer what is related to more uncertain loss,
while not being necessarily optimal from the point of view of classical utility theory.
According to Definition 7.5, an alternative with more certain loss is more repulsive than
that one with more uncertain loss. In other words, subjects simply prefer alternatives that are
less painful to them, when they choose those having more uncertain losses. Using this view
point, the origin of the isolation effect can be easily understood in the framework of QDT.
Let us consider a lattice L = {pin} of prospects (103). And let the actions Aj be enumerated
so that ∑
j
p(A1Xj) = sup
n
∑
j
p(AnXj) . (107)
Then, according to classical utility theory, the prospect pi1 should be preferred to all other pin,
with n 6= 1. In reality, however, this does not happen (McCaffery and Baron, 2006), when pi1
is more uncertain or potentially more harmful. Subjects choose another prospect pin from L,
with n 6= 1, which is less uncertain or harmful than pi1.
Proposition 13. For a lattice L = {pin} of prospects (103), under condition (107), there
exists a prospect pin, with n 6= 1, which is preferred to pi1, when and only when the prospect pi1
is so uncertain or harmful that
q(pi1) < q(pin) +
∑
j
p(AnXj) − sup
n
∑
j
p(AnXj) . (108)
Proof: Equation (107) is a slight generalization of the majorization condition (94) in the
inversion paradox. Therefore the proof of inequality (108) is the same as in Proposition 8. If
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Eq. (107) is strengthened by the majorization condition (101), then the isolation effect reduces
to the disjunction effect and can be treated as in Proposition 11.
Remark 9.9. In classical utility theory, where there is no decision interference, all q(pin) are
vanishing. In this case, the left-hand side of inequality (108) is zero, while the right-hand side
is negative, leading to a contradiction. The isolation effect is thus a paradox in the framework
of classical utility theory, which is absent in QDT.
9.10 Combined paradoxes
It may happen that several paradoxes among those considered above occur simultaneously. In
the literature, one usually studies each paradox separately. This suggests to consider different
experimental situations in which several paradoxes occur simultaneously in order to test our
QDT through novel predictions in context not yet explored. To prove theoretically that such
a situation can really happen, we analyze below the conditions under which the conjunction
fallacy could coexist with the inversion paradox, and therefore, with the disjunction effect which
is a particular case of the inversion paradox.
We consider two actions A = A1 + A2 and X = X1 +X2 from the action ring A. And let
the prospect pin be formed as in Eq. (103), with M1 = M2 = 2. We are thus dealing with the
binary lattice
L = {pin ≡ AnX : n = 1, 2} . (109)
Suppose that the Xj’s are enumerated so that
p(A1X1) ≡ sup
j
p(A1Xj) (j = 1, 2) . (110)
This is just a notation, which simplifies the following formulas. In this notation, the conjunction-
fallacy condition (104), taking account of Eq. (105), simplifies to
p(pi1) < p(A1X1) . (111)
Depending on the value of p(A1X1), three different situations can be found.
Proposition 14. Let us consider the binary lattice (109), with notation (110). And assume
that
p(A1X1) <
1
2
. (112)
Then the conjunction-fallacy condition (111) makes the prospect pi2 preferred to pi1, so that
p(pi1) < p(pi2).
Proof. Suppose that the conjunction-fallacy condition (111) holds, which is a particular
case of Eq. (104). According to Proposition 12, the necessary and sufficient condition for the
validity of Eq. (104) is inequality (106). The latter, with notation (110), reads as
q(pi1) < −p(A1X2) . (113)
Keeping in mind the interference alternation theorem (Proposition 2), which for a binary lattice
takes the form of Eqs. (62), inequality (113) can be rewritten as
q(pi2) > p(A1X2) . (114)
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For the right-hand side of Eq. (114), from condition (112), we have
p(A1X2) >
∑
j
p(A1Xj) −
1
2
. (115)
Using the normalization condition (57) gives
∑
j
p(A1Xj) −
1
2
=
1
2
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] . (116)
In this way, inequality (113) acquires the form
q(pi2) > p(A1X2) >
1
2
∑
j
[p(A1Xj)− p(A2Xj)] . (117)
This shows that Eq. (102) is valid, which, in the case of a binary lattice, is the necessary and
sufficient condition for pi2 > pi1 (pi2 is preferred to pi1).
Proposition 15. Let us suppose that for the binary lattice (109), with notation (110), the
inequality
p(A1X1) >
1
2
(118)
holds. Then the assumption that pi2 is preferred to pi1, in the sense that p(pi1) < p(pi2), results
in the conjunction-fallacy condition (111).
Proof: For a binary lattice, the necessary and sufficient condition for p(pi1) < p(pi2) is
inequality (102). Employing Eq. (116) gives
q(pi2) >
∑
j
p(A1Xj) −
1
2
. (119)
Under condition (118), one has
∑
j
p(A1Xj) −
1
2
> p(A1X2) . (120)
Combining Eqs. (119) and (120) yields Eq. (114), which is equivalent to inequality (113). The
latter is the necessary and sufficient condition for the conjunction-fallacy Eq. (111).
Proposition 16. Let us assume that for the binary lattice (109), with notation (110), the
equality
p(A1X1) =
1
2
(121)
is satisfied. Then the conjunction-fallacy condition (111) is the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for pi2 to be preferred to pi1, so that p(pi1) < p(pi2).
Proof: The proof is the same as in Propositions 14 and 15, except that inequalities (115)
and (120), under equality (121), are replaced by the equality
p(A1X2) =
∑
j
p(A1Xj) −
1
2
. (122)
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Remark 9.10. The proofs of Propositions 14, 15, and 16 do not depend on the relation
between p(A1Xj) and p(A2Xj). Therefore, if in addition to the assumptions underlying these
propositions, we invoke the majorization condition (94), then the above propositions describe
the interconnection between the conjunction fallacy and the inversion paradox. And if we add
the majorization conditions (101), then we obtain the relation between the conjunction fallacy
and the disjunction effect. The simultaneous occurrence of the latter two effects has not been an-
alyzed experimentally, as far as we are aware. But, as we have proved, it may happen. From the
analysis of the available experimental data on the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman,
1983; Machina, 2008), we find that the latter is usually characterized by condition (112). Thus,
we predict that the conjunction fallacy should be accompanied by the disjunction effect.
10 Outlook
We have presented a detailed description of Quantum Decision Theory (QDT), whose ideologi-
cal source can be found in the insightful writings of Niels Bohr on the qualitative interpretations
of measurements in quantum theory (Bohr, 1933, 1937, 1961). Bohr advocated the feasibility
of describing psychological processes, such as decision making, by means of mathematical tech-
niques of quantum theory. Developing the theory of measurement, von Neumann (1955) noted
that the projection operators can be treated as statements about events, with the operator
expectations providing the event probabilities. The von Neumann theory of quantum mea-
surement describes the situation when an observer accomplishes measurements on a passive
quantum system (Benioff, 1972a,b,c). We have extended the von Neumann theory in several
aspects summarized below.
(1) The principal novelty of our approach viewed from the vantage of measurement theory is
the possibility of applying it to active systems making decisions. This is achieved by introducing
a specific state, the strategic state of mind, characterizing the considered decision maker.
(2) We have specified the basic techniques of QDT so that they could be applicable to real
decision processes. In particular, the manifold of intended actions is defined as a noncommuta-
tive ring, since noncommutativity is a typical property that captures accurately what we believe
is an essential property of human decision making. The set of action prospects is characterized
as a complete lattice.
(3) The point of fundamental importance in our approach is that the action prospects
are described as composite objects, formed by composite actions. The composite structure
of prospects, together with the entangling properties of probability operators, result in the
appearance of decision interferences, which take into account the uncertainties and repulsion
to potential harmful consequences associated with the decision procedure.
(4) The noncommutativity of prospects and their interference are shown to be intimately
connected, and they arise simultaneously.
(5) The interference of prospects is proved to exhibit the property of alternation, leading to
the suppression of the probabilities of more uncertain or potentially more harmful prospects in
favor of those of less uncertain or less harmful prospects which are comparatively enhanced.
(6) We have demonstrated that practically all known anomalies and paradoxes documented
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in the context of classical utility theory are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes,
all of which finding straightforward explanations in the framework of QDT.
(7) We predict that some of the analyzed effects can occur together. For instance, the
conjunction fallacy is found to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect.
The major novel results of the present paper is the mathematical development of the decision
theory, based on quantum rules, and the proof that all known paradoxes of classical decision
theory find a natural explanation in the frame of this quantum decision theory.
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